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"Philosophy is every man's 
business. . . it is too important 
to be left to the experts". 
W i l l i a m J a m e s 
Ethymologically philosophy means "love of wisdom", but if we 
were to define it, we could call it "the love of" , and therefore, "the 
quest for truth". Truth, wherever it is to be found: whether in a 
formal principle of reasoning (Logic), in a form of beauty (Aesthetics), 
in an ideal conduct (Ethics), in a type of government (Politics) or in 
the ultimate reality of things (Metaphysics). 
We all too well know, however, that, generally speaking, there 
is no easy path to truth. Truth, whatever the f ield of research, for 
its intrinsic and essential characteristic of uniqueness, whenever 
attained, constitutes a conquest. And conquest means struggle. 
Struggle against all forms of errors, fallacies, deceptions, distortions 
and falsities. 
It goes without saying that language plays an important role 
in this struggle: the all important role of bringing images, ideas and 
concepts f rom the vague, indefinite, transient, somehow aery and 
nebulous state of thoughts to the more consistent, definite, permanent 
state of words. 
Language, in other words, is a means and therefore it has its 
worth in the end it serves. It is interesting to note, in this regard, 
that whenever we pronounce the word "means" our mind goes 
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instinctively and instantaneously to that something which the means 
serves. We can hardly think of a "means" without associating it w i th 
the thing it is used for, the "end". 
A means alone, in itself and by itself, has no reason to exist. 
Man would have never dreamt of constructing a train if he had not 
envisaged the purpose it could serve. No train has ever run which 
was not meant to transport something. Even o toy train, besides 
serving the purpose of entertaining a child, transports countless loads 
in the imaginative mind of its little operator. 
And so it is w i th language. It serves the all useful purpose ot 
conveying our thought to others. Without language, every man, 
indeed, would be an island. The importance of language being what 
it is, it goes without saying that the proper usage of it should be a 
special object of our care and study. 
However, important as it is, language is still but a "means", 
that is to say, it is at the service of something else, which, as we 
said, happens to be our thought. Thought, so to speak, travels on 
language as a passenger travels on a train, and, in a manner, that, 
wherever there is language we expect to f ind thought. More or less 
meaningful thought, of course (as the case might be), but thought 
anyhow. 
Now, in centuries of more or less successful attempts to give 
an answer to the numerous interrogatives of philosophy, there has 
been, for better or worse, such an accumulation of mental matter (in 
terms of spoken and, consequently, of wri t ten language) between 
us and the problems themselves, that philosophical skies have grown 
hazier, perspectives dimmer, and, in many cases, I am afraid, the 
very sight of the problems has been lost. 
If we open a current treatise of philosophy, indeed, it wi l l not 
take us long to f ind out that philosophy, as it is, has much wandered 
off the original path it was meant to tread. I mean, w e wi l l have to 
go a long way before w e f ind such interesting and capital problems 
as those concerning, for example, "The Existence of God", "The 
immortality of the Soul", "The Presuppositions of Ultimate Reality", 
"Knowledge and Existence'" "Body-Mind Relation", "Truth and Error" 
"Good and Evil", "Space and Time", "Reality", "The Entity of Physical 
Things", "Consciousness", "Value" and alike, clearly, plainly, un-
cloudedly, simply, uninvolvedly, straightforwardly and, may I add, 
decidedly met and dealt wi th. 
Now, I do not doubt that discussions such as, for example the 
fo l lowing, on 'The Theory of Types": 
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For al! their drastic character the segregatory technique ot 
the theory of types prove insufficient to cure all philosophical 
confusions which can be attributed to excessive confidence 
in grammatical structure as a guide to logical form. A notable 
instance of such confusion arises in connection wi th the 
syntactical properties of frases of the form -so and so.1 
and others concerning "The Theory of Descriptions as a Meta-
phisically Neutral Technique of Translations",2 or "The Doctrine ot 
Logical Constructions and its Reliance upon the Principle of Reduci-
bil ity to Acquaintance",3 may, in the long run, prove relevant in 
reaching the practical conclusions sought by Bertrand Russell in his 
"Search for the Ultimate Constituents of the World",4 but the fact is 
that they do prove alarmingly inadequate in getting our interest. 
Perhaps it is because of the nature of the subject, perhaps it 
is because of the nature of our mind, the fact is that philosophers 
get often, lengthily, terribly, unforgivably involved in questions of 
not extremely evident relevance. It seems to me that almosl 
unconsciously they slip into the futi le performance of verbal virtuo-
sities, twists of words, linguistic acrobatisms, which remind me so 
much of the twists of hands, fumblings, f iddlings, the musicans 
engage in, for the mere sake of warming themselves up, or of tuning 
their instruments up, at a concert, before the real performance starts. 
Now, it is not that I want to underrate Semantics, Pragmatics, 
Syntax, Symbolism and the host of related fields of the linguistic 
family. Problems of Language have a place of long standing in 
Philosophy. Plato himself dedicated to the subject an entire dialogue 
(Kratylos). Inquiries as to the role of language in thought were 
conducted Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Hobbes, Bacon, Descartes, 
Spinoza, Locke, Berkeley and a host more.5 
1 Max Black, in an overall evaluation of Bertrand Russell's philosophy groups this discussion 
on the "Theory of Types" and the fol lowing ones, which I also am citing, under the 
comprehensive title: "Search for the Ultimate Constituents of the Wor ld" . Max Blak, 
Language and Philosophy, Ithaca (N.Y.) , Cornell University Press, 1949, p. 122. 
2 Ibid. p. 125. 
3 Ibid. p. 127. 
4 Ibid. p. 122. 
5 Aristotle, Interpretation, CH. 1-5; Posterior Analytics, BK . l , CH.10; Soul, BK.II , CH.8. 
St. Augustine, Confessions, BK.XI, par. 5; BK.XII , par. 32-36 & par. 41-43; BK.XIM, 
par. 36; Christian Doctrine, BK . l , CH.13; BK.I I , CH.3 & CH.36. St. Thomas, Summa 
Theologlca, I, Q . X I I I , A . l , Ans. and Rep. 3; Q .XXXIV , A . l , Ans. and Rep. 1-3; Q.LXI I I , 
A .8 , Rep. 1; Q.CVI I , A . l , Rep. 1-2; III , Q . V I , A .6 , Rep. 3; Q .LX, A .6 , Ans. T. Hobbes, 
Leviathan, Part I & Part IV. F. Bacon, Novum Organum, BK. l , Apht. 14. R. Descartes, 
Rules, XI I I ; Discourse, Part V. B. Spinoza, Ethics, Part II, Prop. 40, Schol. 1 & Prop. 47, 
Schol. J. Locke, Human Understanding, BK. l , CH.I , Sect. 15; BK.I I , CH.XVI, Sect. 5-7; 
CH.XXI I , Sect. 3-9 & CH.XXXII , Sect. 7-8; BK. I l l , CH. I, Sect. 6 & CH. I l l , Sect. 1-5. 
G. Berkeley, Human Knowledge, Intro., 19, 21-25; Sect. 121-122. 
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Problems such as those pertaining, for example, to questions of 
method, analyses of meaning, definition of determining concepts, 
consideration of a formalized language to be dealt w i th in a mathe-
matical fashion, and alike, sure are central to the philosophical 
pursuit of establishing ever more defined rules of understanding 
among ourselves. But are these mere linguistic problems going to 
polarize the attention of the contemporary philosophers, monopolize 
their best intellectual resources and channel them towards the study 
of questions which, important as they might be, still are but ancillary 
to those of the main body of philosophical investigation? Without a 
properly defined language surely there is not going to be a proper 
philosophy. But to sacrifice our best energies to the insatiable Baal 
of semantic perfection, to burn the crop of our philosophical intellects 
on the altar of endless linguistic polemics, this seems to me an inex-
cusable waste. 
In so doing I think we are acting not more wisely than the pro-
gressive-minded citizens of Milocca in one of Pirandello's wel l known 
short stories. They (the citizens) badly needed to solve the problem 
of modernizing the lighting system of their town, and to this end 
they held regular and heated meetings. But in view of the fact that, 
year after year, the neighboring towns displayed always new and 
improved methods of lighting, they never got to agree on which 
method to adopt. That is why, to this very day, they still are, perio-
dically, deep in the heated discussions, and, at night, still deep in 
the dark. 
And so, to return to the Language problem, we are more than 
justified in looking for a good, or at least, satisfactory method of 
defining our words and of confining them to the desidered meaning. 
But let us not get lost in the search. Of course we should apply our 
skills towards the construction of ever more perfected means of 
communication, but let us not forget to board them to reach our 
destination! 
As things stand now, wi th philosophers engulfed in linguistic 
disquisitions and subtleties and so much off the main track of real 
philosophical investigation, it is no wonder that the general public 
of educated persons is ever more estranging itself f rom the cause 
of the science wich Wil l Durant, in his golden little book, called "the 
front trench in the siege of truth"." 
"Follow her (Philosophy) — said Socrates to Crito — and serve 
her and be of good cheer!" But how could we possibly blame anyone 
6 Wil l Durant, The Story of Philosophy, N.Y., Simon & Schuster. 1926, p. 2. 
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for fail ing to show any sizable amount of enthusiasm or for fail ing 
to be taken wi th sudden fits of optimism and confidence at the 
thought of solving such problems as those contemplated by "The 
Linguistic Analysis of Sceptical Arguments", or by "The Extension of 
the Analysis to the Logical Relations between Vague Symbols", or 
by "The Immediate Inference not Involving Obversion which Can 
Be Represented as Valid Inferences in the Functional Calculus of 
First Order"? 
Certainly, these and consanguineous problems demand our vi-
gilant attention, but let us not call on the general mobilization ot 
our best intellects to f ind out whether "Vagueness is Subjective" or 
"The Probability Interpretation of Inductive Arguments is a Solution 
of the Problem of Induction". Let us not wake up the town to tell 
the people that "today is Monday is true — today is Monday", or 
that "London is a city is true — London is a city". 
If we can go placidly to bed, every night, and even sleep, whi le 
ful ly aware of the fact that philosophers have not yet given an 
answer to such questions as: "Is the wor ld divided into mind and 
matter? Is mind subject to matter, or is it possessed of independent 
powers? Has the universe any unity or purpose? Is it envolving 
towards some goal? Are there really laws of nature, or do w e believe 
in them only because of our innate love of order? Is man what he 
seems to the astronomer, a tiny lump of impure carbon and water 
impotently crawling on a small and unimportant planet? Or is he 
what he appears to Hamlet? Is he perhaps both at once? Is there a 
way of l iving that is noble and another that is base, or are all ways 
of l iving merely futi le?",7 why should we, on the other hand, be 
thrown of f our balance, run ourselves out into vasomotor deran 
gements or perhaps display ancient Norsemen warior-like battle 
frenzy, at the simple thought that, maybe, "The Standard of Justi-
fication can be profitably employed by Critics of Induction" or that 
"The Tractatus of Wittgenstein may be Self-Contradictory , or that 
"a Definition of the Consistency Profile has been successfully worked 
out"? 
Philosophy, in and of itself and to start with, is not an easy 
subject. We have had, to this effect, old complaints 
. . .the philosopher, setting down wi th thorny arguments the 
bare rule, is so hard of utterance and so misty to be con 
ceived, that one that has no other guide but him (to virtue) 
7 Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1945, 
p. vi i i . 
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shall wade in him till he be old before he shall f ind suf-
ficient cause to be honest. For his knowledge standeth so 
upon the abstract and general that happy is the man who 
may understand him, and more happy that can apply what 
he doth understand. . . s 
and new ones 
. . . w h a t I found in proper philosophy was an abstract 
intellectualism that led me nowhere and contributed nothing 
to my understanding of human nature or the wor ld about 
me. It is a realm of metaphysical systems that seem at 
distant removes from actuality.9 
and yet, paraphrasing an Italian adage which says "Ne uccide più' 
la gola che la spada" (more are killed by gluttony than by sword), 
I think w e could say: more people are kept away f rom Philosophy 
because of the linguistic zeal of its champions than because of the 
abstruseness of the subject itself. 
In a beautiful day of spring, when the sun shines bright and 
all gods seem to be smiling, when the potentialities of nature seem 
to be all in act, when Heaven and Earth seem to have ful f i l led all 
their promises, who does not feel a poet at heart? Similarly, at the 
hour of doom, when misfortune strikes and the wor ld seems to 
grow deaf to our cries, w h o does not ask "Why?" 
Who, at one stage or another of his life has not tried to under-
stand certain features of the wor ld he lives in, or w h y he lives in 
it, or why certain peoples hold certain principles of morality to be 
right and others do not? 
Who, in one word, has never asked a question? (Perhaps -
here we are tempted to say — he who never was a child). 
The fact is that w e are all born-philosophers in as much as 
Philosophy is a way of dealing wi th questions as well as an attempt 
to solve certain basic problems of universal interest. 
Philosophy is the study of Being, of the Reality in which we 
live. It is not something apart f rom life, it is l i fe itself under the 
microscope of a stringent logic. 
No one can live without knowing, thinking, judging, in other 
words, without plilosophizing. And I do not mean to saythat we 
8 Sir Philip Sidney, An Apology for Poetry, London, Nelson, 1965, pp. 106-107, (original 
title of the work: Defense of Poesy, first published in 1595). 
9 Philip Freund, Th« Art of Reading the Novel, New York, Collier, 1965, p. 18. 
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should all be Kants or Leibnitzes or Spinozas, just as we can not all 
be Shakespeares, Alighieris or Shelleys. However, in view of the 
fact that we are talking, here, of two subjects, namely Poetry and 
Philosophy, which, as we said, f ind a natural, responsive chord in 
human hearts, why should not mankind, as a whole, enjoy and 
therefore appreciate the works of philosophy just as it enjoys and 
appreciates the works of poetry? 
Of course, acquiescing to the situation and, perhaps, recalling 
that even in the times of its glorious origins there was someone 
who portrayed Socrates as an idle rider of clouds or Thaïes as fall ing, 
feet and all, in a hole, while sticking his nose to the stars, we could 
easily say: "Well, this seems to be the lot of Philosophy!" 
However, I maintain that this is needlessly so. 
If philosophers could devote themsleves a little more to the 
study and discussion of the genuine questions that really interest 
people, if they could drop a little of the linguistic animosity they 
have among themselves, in favor of a more genuine concern for 
the investigation of the problems that more deeply and longer have 
pressed mankind, if, in one word, they could give us again the 
pleasure that Leonardo called "the joy of undestanding', then, I 
think, the thinking and, much too often, suffering humanity would, 
once more, join forces wi th the daring host of practicing philosophers 
in a communion of intent and attempt. I mean,, if Philosophy could 
relive the great Era of Platonic discussions, alternately earthy and 
sublime, about the problems of thought and action, of life and death, 
of man both as social creature and as a participant in eternity, if the 
true flavor of those epic debates could be recaptured, if, to sum it 
up, human imagination could be set afire again in its everlasting 
pursuit of lasting happiness and wisdom, then, I think, once again 
we would turn to Philosophy not only for answers but for stimulation 
and inspiration as well , not only for consolation but for enlightenment 
and guidance as well , on the road to Truth, the read that once found, 
for the Oneness of Truth itself, can not but lead to the One Who 
is the Way, the Light, the Truth itself. 
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